Liang Bai on the Economic Consequences of the Cultural Revolution by Bai, Liang
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liang Bai on the Economic Consequences of the Cultural
Revolution
Citation for published version:
Bai, L Liang Bai on the Economic Consequences of the Cultural Revolution.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Bai, L. Liang Bai on the Economic Consequences of the Cultural Revolution
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Focus paper
The Cultural Revolution is a watershed 
moment in 20th-century Chinese history. 
Spanning a decade from 1966 to 1976, it 
constitutes the final years of Mao Zedong’s 
chairmanship, and shortly precedes the 
country’s economic liberalization. Intended 
as a campaign to consolidate 
the communist revolution of 1949 by 
“cleansing the class ranks” of “bourgeois 
elements,” its accompanying violence 
and chaos is widely believed to have had 
a major impact on Chinese society. My 
research project explores the economic 
consequences of this period, focusing on 
the rural experience.
With its purported goals of tackling 
inequality and forestalling a “capitalist 
restoration,” the “Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution” was a catastrophic event for 
large sections of the population, especially 
members of the educated elite. All across 
China, because of their perceived lack 
of commitment to socialism, individuals 
with so-called “bad class backgrounds” 
(e.g. former landlords, rich peasants, 
intellectuals) were particularly at risk (Su 
Econo
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2011). Existing estimates of the number of 
fatalities range from 250,000 to 1.5 million, 
while that of victims, including those 
imprisoned and otherwise persecuted, is 
closer to 30 million (Walder and Su 2003). 
In addition to this targeted violence, 
there was widespread disruption to the 
functioning of government services, 
most notably the closure of schools and 
universities. Taken together, this has 
often led to the cohorts growing up 
during this period being labelled as 
China’s “lost generation”. 
   
Although perhaps the most direct, the 
loss of human capital is only one channel 
through which the revolution may 
have affected the country’s subsequent 
economic development. Another potential 
channel is the erosion of social capital. 
Violence within communities may have 
made trust and cooperation more difficult, 
thereby worsening the functioning of 
informal credit and risk-sharing institutions. 
Yet another potential consequence of 
exposure to violent conflict is an induced 
change to one’s time and risk preferences. 
Previous studies have found that such 
experiences can cause people to be more 
impatient and risk-seeking (Callen et al. 
2011; Voors 2012). This in turn has many 
important implications for savings 
and investment decisions. 
Finally, the revolution is often thought 
to have influenced the timing and choice 
of economic policies during the reform 
era (Xu 2011). One key example was 
the de-collectivization of agriculture 
and the introduction of the “household 
responsibility system,” which made 
agricultural households the residual 
claimants of their output, and enabled 
the return of rural markets. The decision 
of when to implement this policy 
varied substantially across regions. This 
heterogeneity allows for the testing of 
two competing hypotheses. On the one 
hand, if the revolution succeeded in 
shaping ideologies, more revolutionary 
areas would have been more reluctant to 
embrace these market-oriented reforms. 
On the other hand, the revolution’s 
excesses may have accelerated the 
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pace of economic reform, due to a 
“reactionary backlash” effect, in which 
case worse-affected areas would have 
liberalized sooner.
While there is no shortage of theoretical 
mechanisms through which this period 
may have influenced subsequent economic 
development, it has not been possible to 
explore them systematically until now, 
mainly due to a lack of data. In my paper, 
I construct a county-level panel dataset 
of economic outcomes using regional 
gazetteers and population censuses, 
combined with rare data on the extent 
of violence during the revolution (Walder 
and Su 2003).  
A key challenge to estimating the causal 
impact of revolutionary intensity on 
economic outcomes is the presence 
of potential confounding factors. To 
address this, I control for pre-revolution 
outcomes and province fixed effects in 
the econometric estimation. Moreover, 
temporary fluctuations in local economic 
conditions during the violence years, as 
driven by climate shocks, provide one 
source of plausibly exogenous variation in 
violence intensity. 
In terms of the determinants of 
revolutionary activity, areas with a higher 
male-to-female gender ratio among 15-24 
year-olds in 1970 experienced greater levels 
of violence. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
given the role of the largely-male ``Red 
Guards’’ as perpetrators. Second, areas 
with abnormal levels of precipitation (i.e. 
either drought or flooding) during the late-
1960s experienced less violence. A likely 
explanation for this relationship is that 
individuals and local governments focused 
on dealing with agricultural shortages 
diverted their efforts and attention away 
from “struggling against class enemies” as 
part of the revolution. 
This relationship between transitory shocks 
to agricultural income and revolutionary 
intensity enables the estimation of the 
latter’s impact on subsequent economic 
outcomes. An instrumental-variables 
strategy is used to address both omitted 
variable bias and classical measurement 
error. A key identifying assumption is that 
climate shocks in the late-1960s should 
not have long-term impacts of their own. 
Reduced-form estimates using climate 
shocks from nearby, non-revolution years 
indeed find this to be the case. 
The empirical results show large and 
negative effects of revolutionary intensity 
on economic outcomes, such as the extent 
of industrialization and per-capita output. 
These impacts are detectable more than 
thirty years later, with some beginning 
to decline at longer time horizons. For 
instance, an increase in reported deaths of 
50 persons (compared with an average of 
86 persons per county) is estimated to have 
caused a 17% decrease in the fraction of 
population employed in industry in 1982. 
The magnitude of this effect is reduced 
to 11% by 1990. Both are significant at 
the 95% level of confidence. By 2000, the 
estimated magnitude is further reduced to 
3%, and no longer statistically significant. 
The effect on per-capita GDP is equally 
large. Here an increase in reported deaths 
of 50 persons is associated with a 10% 
decrease in 1982. Moreover, this effect 
appears to be more persistent, with an 
estimated magnitude of 15% in 2000. 
Both results are again significant at 
the 95% level. 
In terms of mechanisms, there is evidence 
to support the human capital channel, in 
that worse-affected areas tend to have 
significantly fewer college graduates 
as a percentage of their populations. 
Furthermore, these areas have been less 
successful at attracting migrants during the 
post-1978 reform era. As for the timing of 
policy reforms, there does not appear to 
be systematic differences along the lines of 
revolutionary intensity. 
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